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Abstract 
Since its conception in 1998, an average of just 21% of offenders charged under s 98A have been convicted. This 
is much lower than the average for all criminal charges (78%). This paper firstly focuses on the difficulties of 
defining ‘organised crime’ before examining the context in which s 98A was created in 1998 and later amended. 
This examination highlights that s 98A has mixed conceptual origins.  
The paper then identifies two factors which may be contributing to s 98A’s low conviction rate. 1) the burden on 
the prosecution to establish the criminal group’s common prohibited objective is difficult to satisfy, and often 
requires the prosecution to establish another substantive offence; and 2) s 98A is regarded as a subsidiary offence 
which is often withdrawn. A number of factors which increase the likelihood of the charges being withdrawn are 
submitted. The paper concludes that any benefits stemming from s 98A in an evidence gathering and efficiency 
enhancing capacity do not quell the perception that s 98A is a problematic provision.  
Key words: 
Organised crime, gangs, criminal group, group liability, section 98A.   
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I Introduction 
How do we measure the “success” of a provision of the criminal law? Does the conviction rate 
directly translate to a provision’s efficacy? Does a low conviction rate automatically mean a 
provision is problematic? This paper explores these questions in the context of evaluating s 
98A of the Crimes Act 1961.  
Section 98A is New Zealand’s only substantive offence which penalises participation in an 
organised criminal group.1 As such, s 98A ostensibly holds an important role in dismantling 
and disrupting organised crime in New Zealand.2 Information obtained from the Ministry of 
Justice reveals the use and success of prosecution under s 98A.3 The information is detailed in 
Appendix 1 and illustrates that the rate of conviction under s 98A is far lower than the national 
average. Since its enactment only 21% of offenders charged under s 98A have been convicted. 
This is compared to a conviction rate of 78.31% in respect of all criminal charges over the same 
period (1999-2014). Immediately, this low rate suggests that there is something problematic 
with s 98A. Although this paper cannot prove why this rate is so low, it identifies three factors 
which may lead to the low rate: 
a) the genesis of s 98A has meant it has mixed conceptual origins; 
b) the burden on the prosecution to establish the group’s prohibited objective is difficult 
to satisfy; and 
c) s 98A is often regarded in practice as a subsidiary offence whereby the practicalities of 
prosecuting under the provision frequently require withdrawal of the charges.  
This paper suggests that although s 98A may be useful in the fight against organised crime as 
an evidence gathering and efficiency enhancing tool it is nonetheless problematic and 
unprincipled.  
However, in order to give context to this analysis, an understanding of what is meant by 
organised crime must first be established. It is to this definition the paper first turns.  
                                                 
1  Crimes Act 1961, s 98A.  
2  Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand Organised Crime in New Zealand 2010 (New 
Zealand Police September 2010) at 4.  
3  Ministry of Justice “Official Information Act 1982 Request” (4 May 2015) 52815 (Obtained under 
Official Information Act 1982 Request to the District Courts, Ministry of Justice); Ministry of Justice 
“Official Information Act 1982 Request” (25 June 2015) 53443 (Obtained under Official Information 
Act 1982 Request to the District Courts, Ministry of Justice)  
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A Defining organised crime 
There is no agreed-upon definition of ‘organised crime’4 or its key features,5 yet the term has 
widespread popular and political use.6 Despite a lack of definition, two approaches exist 
through which ‘organised crime’ is targeted by legislation. These are:7 
a) the functional approach which targets specific criminal activities of a certain 
gravity or type. The particular activities, ‘the what’, are considered ‘organised 
crime’; or 
b) the organisational approach which targets actors within a particular group structure 
involved in criminal activities. Conviction is dependent on ‘who’ the offending 
occurred with.  
Due to a combination of functional and organisational approaches the New Zealand 
government has no less than 16 agencies involved in preventing and detecting ‘organised 
crime.’8 The term ‘organised crime’ also justifies the introduction of legal provisions9 bringing 
“an emotional kick which makes it easier to get resources and powers”.10 
Campbell observes that phrases such as ‘organised crime’ in a legal and popular context 
“impart a certain moral opprobrium” useful for creating momentum that justifies legislative 
solutions to the alleged or perceived harms posed by ‘organised crime’.11 Accordingly, an 
understanding of organised crime is linked with the harms implied by it. However, it is difficult 
to elucidate the specific harms meant by the term ‘organised crime’ as perceptions of it change 
in time and place depending on social context.  
This difficulty is compounded by a tension between the local and international dimensions of 
organised crime. On one hand the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) is “deeply 
concerned by the negative… implications related to organized criminal activities” on a 
                                                 
4  Petrus van Duyne “The phantom and threat of organized crime” (1995) 24(4) Crime, Law and Social 
Change 341 at 343.  
5  Zhivan Alach “An incipient taxonomy of organised crime” (2011) 14(56) Trends Organ Crim 56 at 59.  
6  James Finckenauer “Problems of definition: What is organized crime?” (2005) 8(3) Trends Organ Crim 
63 at 63.  
7  Liz Campbell Organised Crime and the Law: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford, Portland, 2013) at 13; 
Alach, above n 5, at 60.  
8  Ministry of Justice Strengthening New Zealand’s Resistance to Organised Crime: an all-of-Government 
Response (August 2011) at 14.  
9  Campbell, above n 7, at 12. 
10  Michael Levi “Perspectives on Organised Crime: An overview” in Howard Journal Reflections on 
Organised Crime: patterns and control (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1998) at 336. 
11  Campbell, above n 7, at 16.  
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transnational or international level.12 However, in contrast there is an understanding that the 
harms of organised crime are best assessed in a specific local context because the fluidity of 
organised crime means “its profile may differ from one part of the world to another.”13 
Attempts to address the harms of organised crime must be expressed in a local context within 
the scope of international understanding, objectives and agreements. In the case of s 98A and 
this paper, New Zealand is the specific local context. 
B Section 98A 
Section 98A was introduced into the Crimes Act 1961 in 199814 and has been amended in 
200215 and 2009. It currently reads:16  
98A Participation in organised criminal group 
(1) Every person commits an offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years 
who participates in an organised criminal group—  
(a)  knowing that 3 or more people share any 1 or more of the objectives (the particular 
objective or particular objectives) described in paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (2) 
(whether or not the person himself or herself shares the particular objective or particular 
objectives); and 
(b)  either knowing that his or her conduct contributes, or being reckless as to whether his 
or her conduct may contribute, to the occurrence of any criminal activity; and 
(c)  either knowing that the criminal activity contributes, or being reckless as to whether 
the criminal activity may contribute, to achieving the particular objective or particular 
objectives of the organised criminal group. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a group is an organised criminal group if it is a group of 3 or more 
people who have as their objective or one of their objectives—  
(a)  obtaining material benefits from the commission of offences that are punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of 4 years or more; or 
(b)  obtaining material benefits from conduct outside New Zealand that, if it occurred in 
New Zealand, would constitute the commission of offences that are punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of 4 years or more; or 
(c)  the commission of serious violent offences; or 
(d)  conduct outside New Zealand that, if it occurred in New Zealand, would constitute the 
                                                 
12  United Nations Office on Crime and Drugs, United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime And The Protocols Thereto GA Res 55/25, A/Res/55/25 (2000).  
13  David McClean Transnational Organized Crime: A Commentary on the UN Convention and its 
Protocols (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007) at 1.  
14  Crimes Act 1961(repealed June 18 2002), s 98A.  
15  Crimes Act 1961(repealed 1 December 2009), s 98A. 
16  Crimes Act 1961, s 98A.  
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commission of serious violent offences. 
(3) A group of people is capable of being an organised criminal group for the purposes of this Act 
whether or not—  
(a)  some of them are subordinates or employees of others; or 
(b)  only some of the people involved in it at a particular time are involved in the planning, 
arrangement, or execution at that time of any particular action, activity, or transaction; or 
(c)  its membership changes from time to time. 
1 Summary of the elements  
a) Organised criminal group 
An organised criminal group is defined as three or more people sharing a common objective 
which is prohibited (“prohibited objective”). These are: 
(a) obtaining material benefits from the commission of offences punishable by four years 
imprisonment;17 or 
(b) the commission of serious violent offences.18 A serious violent offence is defined as an 
offence punishable by 7 years imprisonment which involves either: loss of person’s life; 
serious risk of loss of life; serious injury; risk of serious injury; serious damage to 
property endangering the physical safety of a person or a perversion of the course of 
justice by violent means;19 or 
(c) activities amounting to either (a) or (b) committed outside New Zealand.20  
The 2009 amendment altered the threshold for violent offences, reducing it from 10 years to 
seven making s 98A applicable to more offences.  
                                                 
17  Section 98A(2)(a). 
18  Section 98A(2)(c). 
19  Crimes Act, s 2.  
20  Sections 98A(2)(b) and (c).  
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b) Actus reus  
Section 98A is a conduct crime that requires participation in the organised criminal group.21 
‘Participate’ is not defined in the legislation but carries its ordinary meaning, requiring some 
overt conduct that will or may contribute to criminal activity that in turn will or may advance 
the prohibited objective of the group.22  
c) Mens rea 
There are three cumulative mens rea elements which must be satisfied in order for conviction 
under s 98A.23 An offender must participate with: 
(a) knowledge of the group’s prohibited objective;24 
(b) knowledge that, or be reckless as to whether, their conduct contributes to any criminal 
activity;25 
(c) knowledge that, or be reckless as to whether, their conduct contributes to achieving the 
prohibited objective of the group.26  
(i)  Clarification of mens rea 
These three elements were introduced in 2009 and clarified the two mens rea elements 
previously required. Between 2002 and 2009 an offender under s 98A must have had: 
(a) knowledge that the group was an organised criminal group;27 and 
(b) knowledge or recklessness as to whether their conduct contributes to the occurrence of 
criminal activity.28 
The 2009 amendment made it explicit that the offender does not have to share the prohibited 
objective of the group, merely know of it and that offenders can contribute to any criminal 
activity, not necessarily that which renders the group an organised criminal group under subs 
(2). The only way in which an offender’s own criminal offending must relate to the group is 
that it contributes to achieving the group’s prohibited objective.   
                                                 
21  Section 98A(1).  
22  R v Ngaheu HC Rotorua CRI-2009-063-102, 1 April 2010 at [27]. 
23  Te Kahu v R [2012] NZCA 473 at [14]. 
24  Section 98A(1)(a). 
25  Section 98A(1)(b). 
26  Section 98A(1)(c). 
27  Crimes Act 1961(repealed 1 December 2009), s 98A(1).  
28  Crimes Act 1961(repealed 1 December 2009), ss 98A(1)(a) and 98A(1)(b). 
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d) Punishment 
The original penalty set in 1998 was a maximum of three years imprisonment. This was 
increased to five years in 2002 and 10 in 2009, marking a shift in Parliament’s view of the 
severity of organised crime.29   
Despite the increasing severity and intention of Parliament, the conviction rate under s 98A 
remained low, only increasing to an average of 25% between 2009 and 2014.  
II Genesis of s 98A 
In order to appreciate the factors which could potentially lead to s 98A’s low conviction rate 
one must first gain a sense of the character of the provision and establish the context in which 
s 98A developed. Section 98A is a product of two distinct influences. On one hand, the section 
was created in 1998 as a specific mechanism to address New Zealand gangs and accordingly 
criminalised “participation in a criminal gang”. On the other hand, it was amended in 2002 due 
to New Zealand’s obligation to ratify the United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNTOC). These two influences take different approaches to address 
organised crime, one functional (where particular actions are criminalised) and the other 
organisational (where particular members or actors are criminalised).  
A 1998 enactment  
Section 98A was first introduced on August 20 1996 as part of the Criminal Associations and 
Harassment Bill (HCA Bill). The HCA Bill was seen as “the most wide-ranging legislative 
thrust at gangs the country had ever attempted”30 however, it was not the first legislative 
attempt to crack-down on gang activity and offending.  
1 Previous measures to address gangs 
During the 1970s legislative and policy measures aimed at addressing the “gang problem” in 
New Zealand were first introduced.31 There were suppressive legislative amendments such as 
the Police Offences Amendment Act 1979 which gave the police extensive powers to search 
vehicles under “reasonable suspicion” they were carrying firearms32, and the Sale of Liquor 
                                                 
29  See Sentencing Act 2002, s 7.  
30  Jarrod Gilbert Patched: The History of Gangs in New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 
2013) at 220.  
31  Rawiri Taonui and Greg Newbold “Staunch: Māori Gangs in Urban New Zealand” in Joseph 
Lewandowski and Gregory Streich Urban Social Capital: Civil Society and City Life (Ashgate Pub Co, 
Surrey, 2012) at 171. 
32  Police Offences Amendment Act 1979 (No 133).  
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Amendment Act 1979 which gave pub owners the ability to ban gang patches from their 
drinking establishments.33 Other, more social approaches included the Group Employment 
Liaison Scheme (‘GELS’) established in 1982 which sought to target “hard-to-reach groups” 
suffering from unemployment, including gangs.34 Prime Minister Robert Muldoon said that as 
a result of GELS the gangs had calmed down and gang conflict was reducing.35  
Thus, gangs have continually been in Parliament’s focus since the 1970s, where it has sought 
to implement an organisational approach to address organised crime. This organisational 
approach led to the creation of s 98A.   
2 Social context for s 98A  
Conflict between ‘Bikie gangs’ in the South Island during the mid-1990’s gained nation-wide 
media attention. Tensions between two Christchurch gangs erupted into the public arena in 
1996. Between March and April, three public shootings36 “upset the gang-community 
balance.”37 Similar violence was also occurring in Invercargill as the ‘Black Power’ gang 
clashed with the ‘Road Knights’ as Black Power attempted to establish a chapter in the city.38 
The attempted bombing of the Black Power headquarters39 and multiple shootings40 ensured 
the issue of gangs was squarely in the public eye.  
Using the terminology of Ronald Huff, this violence in Invercargill and Christchurch acted as 
a series of “catalytic events” that helped gain political attention.41 In April 1996 Invercargill 
mayor David Harrington petitioned Parliament calling for more police power to “prevent 
further clashes occurring”.42 Mike Moore MP called for legal measures “at a level of intensity 
and vigour so that it’s just not worth being associated with these kinds of people”.43 In response 
                                                 
33  Sale of Liquor Amendment Act 1979 (No 67).  
34  P Plunkett P, J Hynes, D Crossan Review of The Employment Liaison Service (GELS) (Department of 
Labour, 1986) at 14.  
35  Karen Brown “Gang strife down as work skills on the rise” The Evening Post (Wellington, 11 May 1986) 
at 22.  
36  “Four in court after shot fired at car” New Zealand Herald (Auckland 20 March 1996) at 4; “Police keep 
pressure on gangs to maintain peace” New Zealand Herald (Auckland 18 March 1996) at 16; “Police 
union demands more anti-gang power” New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 30 April 1996) at 4. 
37  Gilbert, above n 30, at 208.  
38  Gilbert, above n 30, at 209.  
39  “Armed police keeping Invercargill peaceful” New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 7 March 1996) at 15.  
40  “Gangs ‘making life untenable’” New Zealand Herald (Auckland 18 April 1996) at 17. 
41  C. Ronald Huff Gangs in America (1st ed, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996) at 312. 
42  New Zealand Herald, above n 43. 
43  “Moore wants tough new laws to smash gangs” New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 1 May 1996) at 2.  
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to sustained pressure, the government announced a Justice and Law Reform Select Committee 
investigation of gangs.44  
This extended focus on gangs in the media and public sphere is an example of “moral panic” 
where:45 
‘[a] condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to 
societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion…’   
The Labour Party used a leaked police report on an alleged merger of gangs to establish the 
gang issue as a “definite matter of urgent public importance.”46 Drawing on comments made 
by the New Zealand Police Commissioner stating that “we [New Zealand] have just five years 
to get on top of this problem or it will become unbeatable and ungovernable”47 the Labour 
Party and the media established the gangs as ‘folk devils’ – those whose nature is cast as 
entirely negative or harmful.48 The HCA Bill was the National Government’s response to this 
moral panic in the lead up the 1996 General Election, ensuring they were not seen as “soft on 
law and order” and the country’s folk devils.49 The HCA Bill received bipartisan support 
through parliament with only the Alliance Party opposing the measure.50  
3 The model 
Section 98A was originally modelled on the Californian State Terrorism Enforcement and 
Prevention Act (STEP) 1988.51 STEP took an organisational approach to address “the state of 
crisis” and identified gangs based on who the members were, rather than the activities the gang 
carried out.52 STEP’s purpose was to eradicate the “clear and present danger to public order 
and safety’ as well as the “terror created by street gangs”.53 The Legislature recognised that “in 
Los Angeles County alone there were 328 gang-related murders in 1986, and that gang 
homicides in 1987 have increased 80 percent over 1986.”54 By comparison, empirical evidence 
of harm, let alone evidence as confronting as California’s, was missing from discussion in New 
                                                 
44  “MPs to focus on gang activities” New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 9 May 1996) at 5.   
45  Stanley Cohen Folk Devils and Moral Panics (St Martin’s Press, New York, 1980) at 9.  
46  (25 June 1996) 556 NZPD 13351.  
47  Ibid. 
48  Cohen, above n 45, at 17. 
49  (25 June 1996) 556 NZPD 13361. 
50  (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5729.  
51  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5532; Timothy Mullins “Broader Liability for Gang Accomplices: 
Participating in a Criminal Gang” (1998) 8 Auckland U L Rev 832. 
52  State Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act Cal Pen Code § 186.21. 
53  Ibid.  
54  Ibid.  
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Zealand. Instead of statistical evidence, it was moral panic which ensured New Zealand’s gang 
issue was of “urgent public importance”.55  
4 The harms addressed 
A theme emerged during each of the HCA Bill’s readings that “the time has come to get 
tough”56 on gang activity because they had become “increasingly sophisticated and 
organised”.57 MPs justified all provisions of the Bill, in particular s 98A, on the basis that gangs 
were “becoming incredibly business-like”58 even comprising “sophisticated illegal business”59 
around the “Business Roundtable of the underworld.”60 Labour MP Phil Goff utilised the 
quintessential words: “we are talking about organised crime.”61  
Despite comments on gangs’ “business-like” qualities, repeated discussion of drug-dealing 
marked the only substantive description of such activities carried out by gangs.62 Any other 
indication of gangs’ “sophistication” as profit-driven enterprises was missing suggesting this 
tone was political rhetoric designed to provide an “emotive kick”.63    
Instead, violent behaviour, such as the public shootings in Christchurch and Invercargill, more 
accurately comprised the fundamental features of ‘organised crime’ in the context of the HCA 
Bill. Violence and intimidation meant gangs were portrayed as ‘folk devils’ in the public arena 
and were the primary catalysts behind the HCA Bill’s introduction. A statement submitted at 
the HCA Bill’s third reading that much of New Zealand’s violent crime stems from the gangs, 
a statement supported by the media’s portrayal of them, attests to the central role violence 
played in the passage of the HCA Bill and its conceptualisation of organised crime.64  
                                                 
55  (25 June 1996) 556 NZPD 13351. 
56  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5532.  
57  Ibid. 
58  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5536 
59  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5542. 
60  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5549.  
61  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5534.  
62  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5536; (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5730, 5742, 5744; (25 June 
1996) 556 NZPD 13357.  
63  See Levi, above n 10.  
64  (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5732. 
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5 Structure 
Originally s 98A criminalised participation in a “criminal gang”, a group of three or more 
people, at least three of whom had been convicted on separate occasions for offences 
punishable by 10 years or more imprisonment or of offences65 that were listed in the section.66 
Section 98A originally applied an organisational approach where liability was dependent ‘who’ 
the gang members carrying out the offending were. An organisational approach targets 
particular groups rather than a type of offending. With this target in mind, s 98A enabled gang 
membership to be criminalised as far as possible without patently impeaching freedom of 
association and other civil rights.67   
Accordingly, the mens rea elements of the offence required knowledge about the group’s 
members rather than knowledge of a prohibited objective as is required under the current 
provision. In order to be liable under the original s 98A an offender must have: 
(a) participated in the gang, knowing it was a criminal gang;68 or 
(b) intentionally promoted or furthered any offence by a member of a criminal gang.69  
A warning mechanism was included in s 98A(5), enabling police to issue warnings to potential 
offenders that their conduct was considered part of a criminal gang, thus ensuring the 
prosecution could establish the required knowledge of group membership at trial.70  
6 Purpose  
The dominant purpose of the original s 98A offence was to prevent recruits from joining gangs 
and becoming folk devils in the community.71 Section 98A would act as a “preventative 
mechanism” not allowing gangs “to take advantage of alienated youth.”72 Although it remained 
unclear how recruitment in gangs was specifically targeted by s 98A, numerous advocates 
                                                 
65  The listed offences were: conspiring to defeat justice, corrupting juries and witnesses, wounding or 
injuring with intent, aggravated injury, theft, money laundering, receiving property dishonestly obtained, 
dealing in controlled drugs prohibited by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975; or using or carrying a weapon 
prohibited by the Arms Act 1983 
66  Crimes Act 1961(Repealed June 18 2002), s 98A(1). 
67  Mullins, above n 51, at 853.  
68  Crimes Act 1961(Repealed June 18 2002), s 98A(2)(a). 
69  Ibid, s 98A(2)(b).   
70  Ibid, s 98A(5).    
71  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5532.  
72  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5535. 
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stated that s 98A’s emphasis on recruitment would address the gang problem in New Zealand 
by stopping individuals becoming “lifelong criminals.”73  
Alongside the already mentioned warning mechanism under s 98A(5), a deterrent purpose 
could only be realised if s 98A was enforced with some regularity, illustrating to potential gang 
members they ran a real risk of imprisonment.74  
In addition, because Parliament took an organisational rather than functional approach in 
creating s 98A, it was a substantive offence which did not require proof of liability for another 
criminal offence. This would help the police prosecute more gang members. In particular, it 
could be used to convict those who were seen as leaders within the gang but did not specifically 
carry out the criminal tasks.75  
However, the original offence under s 98A was rarely used to prosecute any gang members. 
From its conception in 1998 until 2002 there were just 15 people charged with only two of 
those resulting in successful conviction.76 
B 2002 Amendment 
After the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice recommended discussion 
about “organised transitional crime” in 1993, the World Ministerial Conference adopted the 
Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime in 
November 1994.77  
The Action Plan established that organised crime is a “highly destabilising and corrupting 
influence on fundamental social, economic and political institutions”.78 The profit motive was 
seen by the Conference to be “at the heart of organized crime.”79 The UN Secretary-General 
noted that the destabilising power of organised crime stemmed from this profit motive and the 
corresponding ability of criminal organisations to penetrate national economies “poisoning the 
                                                 
73  (27 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5730. See also (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5532, 5545, 5555; (27 
November 1997) 565 NZPD 5738.  
74  Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (6th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 16.  
75  (20 November 1997) 565 NZPD 5559.  
76  “Official Information Act 1982 Request”, above n 3.  
77  The recommendation was approved by Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice GA Res 48/103 
A/Res/48/103 (1993).  
78  World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime: Naples Political Declaration and 
Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime GA Res 49/748, A/49/748 (1994) at 5.  
79  World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime: Organization of the World 
Ministerial Conference GA Res 49/748, A/49/748 (1994) at 22.  
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business climate, corrupting political leaders and undermining human rights”.80 The 
Declaration held the fight against organised crime needed to focus on defeating the economic 
power of criminal organizations.81 The Conference thus promoted “substantive legislation 
penalizing participation in criminal associations”,82 and discussed the definition of organized 
transnational crime. The Declaration listed six characteristics of organised crime including 
group organisation and violence or corruption used to earn profits or control markets.83  
1 UNTOC 
As signed by New Zealand in 2002,84  UNTOC did not contain any definition of organised 
crime or list the types of crimes which it might constitute. Instead it defined an “Organised 
criminal group” as:85 
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert 
with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes [offences punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years86] or offences established in accordance with this 
Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. 
The absence of a definition illustrates the difficulties in such an exercise and also allows 
UNTOC to apply to new types of offending as they emerge. Such flexibility recognises that 
organised criminals will engage in varying activities according to where the opportunities to 
gain financial benefits are available.87 The UN is clearly taking a functional approach to 
organised crime whereby criminalisation is contingent on particular criminal activities as 
opposed to the original s 98A which criminalised using the organisational approach, contingent 
on who carried out the offending.  
The requirement for the offences to be committed for profit “proved controversial” as some 
delegations thought this element was too limiting.88 The Interpretive Notes to the Convention 
respond to this criticism by holding this requirement should be understood broadly. It can 
include crimes where the predominant motive may be sexual gratification, for example, the 
                                                 
80  Ibid, at 18.  
81  Naples Political Declaration, above n 78, at [35].  
82  At [15].  
83  At [12].  
84  Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 12. 
85  Ibid, art 2(a).  
86  Ibid, art 2(b). 
87  Naples Political Declaration, above n 78, at [39].  
88  McCLean, above n 13, at 40.  
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trade of material by members of a child pornography ring.89 Nonetheless, the inclusion of this 
element is a clear reflection of the UN’s understanding that a profit motive is at the heart of 
organised crime.90  
a) Article 5 
Article 5 requires state parties to:91 
1.  …establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: 
… (ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity 
of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active 
part in:  
(a) Criminal activities of the organized criminal group;  
(b) Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or her 
participation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim; 
As elaborated below, UNTOC requires criminalisation of conduct which, “committed 
intentionally”, comprises “an active part” in the activities of the organised criminal group.92 
UNTOC therefore envisages liability with a mens rea threshold of intention. 
2 Incorporation into New Zealand law 
UNTOC’s provisions were incorporated into New Zealand legislation by the Transnational 
Organised Crime Bill 2002 (TOC Bill).93 The TOC Bill formulated a range of new offences, 
particularly in respect of people smuggling and trafficking, the subject of the two protocols to 
UNTOC. Most discussion of the TOC Bill focussed on these provisions. The ‘Tampa Incident’ 
of August 2001 in which 130 asylum seekers were granted refugee status in New Zealand after 
they were denied asylum in Australia may have been a catalyst for this focus.94 However the 
TOC Bill also extended the existing offence in s 98A to criminalise participation in an 
                                                 
89  Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime on the work of its first to eleventh sessions, A/55/383/Add. 1 (2000) at [3].  
90  World Ministerial Conference, above n 79, at 22.  
91  Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 12, art 5.  
92  Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 12, art 5(1).  
93  This Bill was later split into multiple Amendment Acts amending the Crimes Act 1961 and other pieces 
of legislation.  
94  See Mary Crock "In the wake of the Tampa: Conflicting visions of International Refugee Law in the 
management of refugee flows" (2003) 12 Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 49. 
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organised criminal group. Section 98A was altered by largely transposing Article 2 and Article 
5 of UNTOC into the Crimes Act 1961.   
The significance of the change made to s 98A in 2002 was downplayed in Parliament. During 
the TOC Bill’s second reading the Minister of Justice wrongfully stated that the TOC Bill 
“extends the existing offence of participation in a criminal group [rather than “criminal gang”] 
to cover international criminal groups” (emphasis added).95 This statement tactfully avoided 
highlighting that s 98A was previously a mechanism particular to New Zealand’s gang 
situation. Only the Green Party’s Keith Locke identified that “the thrust of the bill is much 
broader than people-smuggling… [it] drastically changes all our domestic law on criminal 
association”.96   
3 Adoption of the functional approach  
The fact that s 98A was altered without much scrutiny in Parliament does not necessarily mean 
it was an ill-conceived amendment. Ratification of UNTOC specifically required New Zealand 
to criminalise participation in a criminal group.97 Section 98A defined and criminalised 
participation in an ‘organised criminal group’, following the definitions of ‘serious offence’98 
and ‘organised criminal group’ contained in UNTOC.99  
The introduction of the “organised criminal group” removed the concept of “criminal gang”, 
dramatically changing the way in which organised crime was criminalised in the local context. 
The organisational approach previously adopted against organised crime was replaced by 
UNTOC’s functional approach whereby criminalisation was contingent on the commission of 
offences of a certain gravity.  
By removing the “criminal gang” it was no longer required for at least three members of the 
criminalised group to have committed previous qualifying offences.100 Thus an organised 
criminal group is broader than a criminal gang which required members to be convicted 
criminals. The warning mechanism in s 98A(5) was also removed.  
                                                 
95  (30 May 2002) 601 NZPD 16727. 
96  (30 May 2002) 601 NZPD 16735.  
97  Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 12, art 5.  
98  The threshold for ‘serious offence’ was the same in both instruments - four years imprisonment. 
99  Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 12, art 2. 
100  Crimes Act 1961(repealed June 18 2002), s 98A(1).   
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4 An accurate ratification?  
On first appraisal, the new look s 98A appeared a reasonable incorporation of UNTOC; those 
who would have been caught participating in a criminal gang could still be criminalised as part 
of an organised criminal group. However in amending s 98A, Parliament surpassed the 
obligations imposed by UNTOC in two ways:  
a) As mentioned above, UNTOC envisages liability with a mens rea threshold of intention. 
Liability under s 98A is much broader than this and can be found if an offender is 
“reckless”.101 Although a mens rea threshold of recklessness is not prohibited by 
UNTOC, it does constitute a considerable extension to the grounds on which liability 
can be found.  
 
Justification for this extension was not provided by Parliament nor the Select 
Committee. However the widening of s 98A could “expand the ability of police to 
smash” criminal organisations102 and by lowering the threshold thus increasing the 
scope of s 98A, it could also be presumed successful convictions under the section 
would become more frequent, improving the conviction rate from a lowly 13.3%.103  
 
b) Under UNTOC, the objectives or aims of an organised criminal group are limited to 
obtaining a “financial or other material benefit”.104 Under s 98A, the objectives of an 
organised criminal group can be much more diverse. Instead of requiring them to seek 
financial or other material benefits, s 98A enables criminalisation of the group if one of 
their objectives is “the commission of serious violent offences that are punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of 10 years or more”.105 
 
The inclusion of the violent offences objective manifestly extends the ambit of s 98A 
beyond that intended by UNTOC. It allows a group to be criminalised for reasons 
disparate from those in UNTOC, no matter how broadly ‘material benefit’ is 
                                                 
101  Crimes Act 1961(repealed 1 December 2009), s 98A(1)(b).  
102  (30 May 2002) 601 NZPD 16737. 
103  Rate of conviction under s 98A from 1998-2002, Appendix 1.  
104  Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, above n 12, art 2(a).  
105  Crimes Act 1961(repealed 1 December 2009), s 98A(2)(c); note, this threshold is currently offences 
punishable by seven years imprisonment.  
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interpreted.106 It also retains some of the original thinking behind s 98A – that organised 
crime is perpetrated by violent gangs.  
 
Parliament clearly intended this extension as New Zealand’s obligations under UNTOC 
were satisfied by s 98A(2)(a) and it nonetheless proceeded to include the objective of 
serious violent offences under s 98A(2)(c). The extension ignores not only the specific 
definition of ‘organised criminal group’ in UNTOC but also the UN’s perception that 
the profit motive would always be “at the heart of organized crime.”107  
C A tension in approach 
It is apparent that the HCA Bill and TOC Bill were products of very different circumstances 
and accordingly tension is present between them. Central to this tension is their conflicting 
vision of what constitutes ‘organised crime’ stemming from their respective organisational and 
functional approaches. The Bills also diverge in their perception of what harm organised crime 
poses to society. As a product of a moral panic which stressed the violent nature of gangs, the 
HCA Bill’s conceptualisation of organised crime is inherently linked to violence and adopts a 
purely organisational approach. Alternatively, the TOC Bill clearly emphasises profit driven 
enterprise as crucial in its conceptualisation of organised crime and criminalises under a 
functional approach. This conflict highlights the difficulties absence of a definition of 
organised crime can create; although both bills seek to address organised crime, the two target 
distinct types of offending.  
This conflict manifests in s 98A. A group can be deemed an organised criminal group if the 
members share a prohibited objective of either maintaining benefits from the commission of 
offences or committing serious violent offences.108 The later prohibited objective “marks a 
sharp departure from general concepts of organised crime… It encompasses situations that may 
be purely emotional or spontaneous”.109 The inclusion of this objective in s 98A is a 
consequence of perceiving organised crime as necessarily involving violence. This inclusion is 
in spite of the s 98A’s primary influence, UNTOC, being only concerned with profit-driven 
crime in its functional approach. Thus, the influence of the HCA Bill’s moral panic and its 
                                                 
106  Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, above n 89, at [3]. 
107  World Ministerial Conference, above n 79, at 22.  
108  Section 98A(2).  
109  Andreas Schloenhardt “Mafias and Motorbikes: New Organised Crime Offences in Australia” (2007) 19 
CICJ 259 at 264. 
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organisational approach where violent gang members perpetrate organised crime has been 
incorporated into s 98A.   
III Problems of principle 
The tension stemming from s 98A’s mixed conceptual origins are compounded when s 98A is 
evaluated against some commonly held principles of criminalisation. Concerns that s 98A may 
not always provide principled outcomes may influence the provision’s rate of successful 
conviction: prosecutors may be less willing to execute charges under s 98A or decision makers 
in the form of judges and juries may be reluctant to impose unprincipled criminal liability.    
A Minimalism and certainty  
The scope of s 98A is wide as it seeks to capture as much offending as possible in order to 
address two distinct harms – violent offending and profit-driven offending. This breadth 
acknowledges that organised crime is by nature variable110 and is justified by claims of ‘social 
defence’; the law responds to a social concern about which “something must be done”.111 In s 
98A’s case, “the threats against New Zealand’s communities, borders, and economy” 
stemming from organised crime.112  
However, such breadth does not sit comfortably with the principles of minimal criminalisation 
and maximum certainty which view the criminal law as last resort113 and something that should 
not be given wide or vague scope in the face of indefinite harms.114 The woolliness of s 98A 
leaves law enforcement agents considerable discretion to use and apply it as they wish and on 
this basis the provision appears apparently unprincipled.  
B Fair Labelling 
Conviction under s 98A does not identify offenders on the basis of their group’s objective; 
there is no distinction between violent and profit-seeking offenders. This is despite the courts 
viewing “offending under s 98A with the objective of committing serious violent offences… 
more seriously than offending with the objective of obtaining material benefits”.115 Similarly, 
s 98A does not distinguish between different levels of involvement within the criminal group, 
leaving this instead to the sentencing judge. 
                                                 
110  Ministry of Justice, above n 8, at 7. 
111  Ashworth, above n 74, at 53.  
112  Ministry of Justice, above n 8, at 6.  
113  Ashworth, above n 74, at 31-33.  
114  Ibid, at 65.  
115  R v Mitford [2005] 1 NZLR 753 at [61].  
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Consequently, conviction for participating in an organised criminal group can misrepresent the 
offender’s level of participation in the criminal offending and the offending itself. Conviction 
under s 98A does not fairly reflect the precise nature, magnitude and moral wrongfulness of 
the actions of a specific offender.116 In this sense s 98A is unprincipled and could be said to 
have a “major weakness”.117 
IV Factors contributing to s 98A’s low conviction rate  
A Burden to establish group objective 
Although s 98A creates a substantive offence that arises out of a group structure it no longer 
criminalises individuals based on the membership of the group they were participating in; 
participation under s 98A is not synonymous with association.118 If s 98A’s application 
extended to mere membership, a group member’s right to freedom of association would be 
severely infringed.119 This means that members of groups ostensibly most likely to comprise 
organised criminal groups (for example prominent gangs like the Mongrel Mob or Black 
Power) due to their public nature and perception are not penalised merely for their membership. 
It has been realised that “a high degree of protection of civil liberties” is needed to ensure group 
membership itself is not criminalised.120  
Civil liberties are protected by the burden on the prosecution to establish the group had a 
common prohibited objective under s 98A(2). Two of the three mens rea elements of the 
offence relate to this objective: an offender under s 98A must have knowledge of the group’s 
prohibited objective;121 and that offender must have knowledge that or be reckless as to whether 
their criminal activity contributes to the group’s prohibited objective.122 The difficulty of 
satisfying this burden may contribute to s 98A’s low conviction rate. 
1 Inference of objective  
An objective is to be assessed prospectively, before the events take place.123 Interception of 
communication is therefore a powerful tool used to establish this knowledge, however its use 
                                                 
116  Barry Mitchell “Multiple Wrongdoing and Offence Structure: A Plea for Consistency and Fair Labelling” 
(2001) 63(3) MLR 393 at 398.  
117  Schloenhardt, above n 109, at 266. 
118  Quin v R HC Auckland CRI-2004-044-7103, 13 March 2006 at [13]. 
119  Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 17.  
120  (30 June 1996) 556 NZPD 5732.  
121  Section 98A(1)(a).  
122  Section 98A(1)(c). 
123  Tamati v R [2013] NZCA 535 at [28].  
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is constrained by the limited availability of interception resources; “interception operations are 
resource-intensive”.124 It is also improbable that evidence specifically documenting the group’s 
objectives is obtainable. Accordingly, evidence which establishes this knowledge can be 
difficult to produce.125 Without such evidence, a prosecution will have to infer the group’s 
objective from their conduct.126 The need for inference was acknowledged by Hammond J who 
held: 127 
“it is difficult to see how the Crown can get a conviction under the s 98A charge without 
traversing the alleged criminal activity of the individuals who were part of the group.”  
At times a whole Crown case can rest on inferences drawn from the conduct of the accused.128  
Knowledge of the prohibited objective must be specific: it “must include knowledge that the 
group’s objective involves the commission of relevant offences.”129 Therefore, “traversing the 
criminal activity” of the group’s members enables the Crown to establish knowledge of the 
specific acts or offences that were carried out as part of the prohibited objective. This means 
that in many cases some other form of substantive offending will necessarily be established as 
part of the de facto prosecutorial approach to s 98A, despite not being required. The charge 
under s 98A could be described as predicated on these other substantive offences. Indeed, the 
Court of Appeal held substantive offending “will often be powerful evidence of breach of s 
98A” similar to overt acts in a conspiracy.130 
The difficulties of establishing knowledge of the prohibited objective were captured in R v 
Tamati.131 The case concerned a shootout between members of the Mongrel Mob gang in 
Wairoa. After Tamati had his patch forcefully removed he vowed to return to the gang’s 
clubhouse where the ‘de-patching incident’ took place.132 When Tamati and his supporters 
returned the following morning with firearms a gun fight broke out where at least 25 shots were 
fired.133 Arnold J held the Crown was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Tamati’s 
                                                 
124  New Zealand Police Association “Submission to the Law and Order Committee on the Gangs and 
Organised Crime Bill at [19].  
125  Interview with Alistair Murray, ex-Taskforce Leader Detective Inspector, Organised Financial Crime 
Agency New Zealand (the author, telephone, 4 July 2015).   
126  Tamati v R, above n 123, at [28].  
127  R v Toman HC Wellington CRI-2002-032-278481, 18 December at [71].  
128  At [35]. See also S v R HC Gisborne T032566, 13 May 2004.  
129  Bruce Robertson (ed) Adams on Criminal Law (online looseleaf ed, Thomson Reuters) at [CA98A.04].  
130  R v Mitford, above n 115, at [50].   
131  Tamati v R, above n 123.  
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group’s objective was the commission of a serious violent offence at the clubhouse which were 
punishable by seven years imprisonment.134 This was despite the fact that Tamati’s group was 
armed, arrived simultaneously at the clubhouse provoked by a humiliating event135 and Tamati 
had unsuccessfully attempted to arrange an alibi.136 Thus, the requirement for knowledge of 
the group’s objective leaves room for an accused to escape liability; the circumstantial evidence 
upon which knowledge of the group’s objective can be inferred must leave no room for “a 
reasonable possibility” of a different, non-prohibited (albeit criminal) objective.137 
2 Nexus of participation and objective 
The requirement for the prosecution to establish an offender’s knowledge or recklessness that 
their conduct contributes to any criminal activity,138 and knowledge or recklessness that such 
criminal activity contributes to the group’s prohibited objective139  creates, in effect, a practical 
requirement to find a nexus between the specific participation of the offender and the group’s 
prohibited objective.  
In order to establish this nexus the prosecution may seek to phrase the alleged objective of the 
group broadly, particularly if the prosecution is inferring the group’s objective from past 
activities. This is because a broad objective appears to engender successful conviction as it 
captures various criminal activities. However, the need for the objective to be specific in order 
to gain conviction conflicts with positing a broad objective.140 Thus the ease of showing 
contribution to the group objective is relative to how that objective is framed. 
The difficulty of establishing this nexus marred the prosecution in S v R141 where evidence was 
submitted by a District Gang Intelligence Officer to establish the group’s objective. Utilising 
his past experience, the Officer held the alleged organised criminal group, the Mongrel Mob, 
are:142 
‘actively involved in offending such as burglary, theft, receiving stolen property, cultivation of 
cannabis, dealing and selling cannabis and other drugs, as well as violence offences such as 
                                                 
134  At [33].  
135  At [6]. 
136  At [27].  
137  At [33].  
138  Section 98A(1)(b). 
139  Section 98A(1)(c).  
140  Robertson, above n 129, at [CA98A.04]. 
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assault, robbery, extortion, and firearms offences... The objectives of the Mongrel Mob include 
the commission of these offences.’ 
The court found such evidence did not establish an objective from which a jury could draw the 
inference that when other offences were committed, they were committed on behalf of the 
Mongrel Mob – i.e. contributed to the prohibited objective of that group.143 Proving previous 
convictions of gang members similarly did not establish the objectives of the group or that their 
subsequent offending was committed on behalf of the group.144 In order to establish the nexus 
between participation and the objective necessarily means the objective posited by the 
prosecution must be specific.  
3 Translating to a low conviction rate 
As seen in Tamati and S v R, the burden of establishing knowledge of the group’s objective or 
how the accused’s conduct contributed to achieving the prohibited objective can prove 
insurmountable with the evidence available to the prosecution. Prosecution in these cases is 
unsuccessful despite the likelihood that there was actually an organised criminal group 
partaking in criminal offending.  
Extending this argument further, the difficulty of establishing s 98A evidence could lead police 
to gather evidence through techniques with unsound legal basis. This would later render the 
evidence inadmissible or able to be excluded under the Evidence Act 2006, again resulting in 
unsuccessful prosecutions under s 98A.145 Two high profile examples of such behaviour 
include R v Hamed where video surveillance footage proved inadmissible evidence to support 
a s 98A charge,146 and R v Antonievic where a “false warrant and prosecution scenario” 
amounted to a misconduct necessitating a stay of proceedings against 10 people charged under 
s 98A.147 If s 98A charges are based on inadmissible evidence they will be withdrawn or 
conviction will be unsuccessful, worsening s 98A’s conviction rate.  
B Subsidiary offence 
Section 98A’s low conviction rate highlights that the provision is an ineffective means of 
prosecuting organised criminals. However, it has been stressed that against such a variable, 
diverse and adaptable threat such as organised crime, “a coordinated, multi-layered approach” 
                                                 
143  At [23].  
144  Ibid.  
145  Evidence Act 2006, s 30.  
146  Hamed v R, [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305.  
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is required.148 As such, s 98A could be understood as just one “layer” in the fight against 
organised crime. With its low conviction rate, s 98A could be regarded as a subsidiary layer to 
the other criminalisation mechanisms targeting organised criminals. This suggestion that s 98A 
is a subsidiary offence is reinforced by the fact that a large proportion of s 98A charges are 
withdrawn: since 1999 over 72% charges under s 98A that did not result in conviction were 
withdrawn and nearly 57% of all charges under s 98A were withdrawn.   
Furthermore, other substantive offences required to establish the objective of the organised 
criminal group will often involve serious and multiple offending.149 This is particularly likely 
if the alleged criminal group is a gang.150 A prominent example would be the manufacture and 
supply of controlled drugs, for example Methamphetamine.151 Accordingly, although 
offending under s 98A is “serious offending” it can often be regarded as secondary to or less 
serious than the other offending.152 The Police themselves have indicated that s 98A charges 
are usually pursued “as adjuncts” or considered subsidiary to these other substantive charges.153 
1 Withdrawal 
As another substantive offence is most often made out against an accused, prosecutors may 
readily withdraw charges under s 98A, especially if conviction is highly likely under these 
other substantive charges. This willingness is clearly reflected in the data in Appendix 1. As 
stressed above, nearly 57% of all charges under s 98A have been withdrawn since 1999.   
Withdrawal may be due to an issue arising under the s 98A charge. For example the members 
of the alleged group may attest to the group having different objectives, thus making 
establishment of the prohibited objective difficult, or the individuals plead guilty to the 
substantive charges but not to the s 98A charge. In such circumstances, withdrawal reflects a 
perception that pursuit of conviction under s 98A is an unjustified use of scarce resources if it 
extends the time and costs of trial when a similar conviction could be obtained under the 
substantive charge(s). 
Accordingly, a large factor in s 98A’s low the conviction rate is a tendency of prosecutors to 
withdraw charges, perhaps as a matter of pragmatic policing. The prevalence of withdrawal of 
                                                 
148  New Zealand Police Association, above n 124, at [3].  
149  Alistair Murray, above n 125.  
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s 98A frustrates the intent of Parliament which seeks to criminalise participation in the 
organised criminal group. Similarly, if a provision’s ‘success’ is determined solely on the basis 
of its conviction rate, s 98A will never be ‘successful’ as a majority of charges are withdrawn. 
However, if organised criminals are being prosecuted, albeit under a different label or 
substantive offence, the problem of s 98A’s low conviction rate and the frustration of 
Parliament’s intent is more theoretical than actual.   
2 Reasons for withdrawal  
Below are factors which increase the likelihood of charges under s 98A being withdrawn.  
a) Sentences under s 98A 
Despite the ‘seriousness’ of a s 98A offence,154 conviction under s 98A is unlikely to materially 
increase an offender’s sentence if they are also convicted under another substantive criminal 
offence. The offence under s 98A and the other substantive offence(s) will only be regarded as 
separate “within the limits of totality”155 whereby sentences must proportionally reflect the 
seriousness of all offending.156 Accordingly, the judiciary has shown a willingness to issue 
sentences under s 98A concurrently. This is because factors relating to the s 98A charge are 
reflected in the substantive charge (for example the material gain punished in s 98A is also 
reflected in drug charges157) or conviction under s 98A has been regarded as “co-extensive” 
with the substantive offending.158 
This means the prosecution may lack incentive to pursue charges under s 98A and a large 
amount of police resources will be focussed on the other substantive charges, prompting the 
withdrawal of s 98A charges.  
b) Overcharging 
Overcharging is described as a tactic used by prosecutors enabling them to facilitate plea 
bargains with an accused.159 Overcharging entails charging the defendant excessively, either 
in number160 or severity, thereby inducing a defendant to plead guilty to some of or less severe 
versions of the original charges.161 
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Although not classic overcharging in the sense that prosecutors charge notwithstanding their 
knowledge that there is insufficient evidence to prove the offence,162 charges under s 98A could 
be akin to an inadvertent form of overcharging as such charges may work to facilitate guilty 
pleas to other substantive charges. As such s 98A charges may be brought against a defendant 
in the knowledge that conviction is relatively inconsequential: a charge under s 98A may be 
able to act as a “bargaining-chip” where the possibility of withdrawal of that charge procures 
a guilty plea to other charges.163  
This is especially so under the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 where an open and transparent 
case review is required if a defendant pleads not-guilty to a s 98A charge.164 During the review, 
case management discussions between the prosecution and the defendant gives s 98A further 
scope to act as a “bargaining-chip”.165  If a s 98A charge is “traded-off” (i.e. withdrawn) in 
return for a guilty plea to another offence it reflects that a modern criminal justice system’s 
“primary goal is processing”.166 Similarly, the risks of unsuccessful prosecution under s 98A 
are offset by the likelihood of conviction under the other substantive offence, meaning the 
prosecution could be apathetic about a s 98A charge’s likely success and lay it notwithstanding 
apparent flaws or issues.167  
c) Evidence gathering tool 
Section 98A plays an important role in gathering evidence.168 Previously police were given a 
warrant to intercept private communications where there were reasonable grounds for believing 
a person had committed, or was committing an offence under s 98A(1).169 Such a warrant is 
now granted under the Search and Surveillance Act 2012.170 An interception warrant will only 
be granted if there are reasonable grounds: 
a) to suspect a person had committed, or was committing an offence;171 and 
b) to believe information material to that offending will be obtained.172 
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In order to reasonably suspect an offence against s 98A, an applicant must apprehend, with 
some evidential basis, that the state of affairs (i.e. that there is a group of three or more people 
are acting with a prohibited objective) may exist.173 There is no need for the applicant to prove 
any substantive offence. Therefore, the threshold for obtaining a warrant under s 98A is 
relatively low compared to other substantive offences.174    
Procurement of warrants in pursuit of s 98A offending can be an important mechanism through 
which Police gather evidence in order to combat organised crime. As s 98A is designed to 
criminalise a criminal group’s diverse range of activities,175 the ability to obtain a warrant under 
the provision is also available in a variety of circumstances.  
However, due to the nature of s 98A and the evidence usually required to establish the offence, 
a warrant under pursuit of a s 98A offence will often uncover evidence of other substantive 
offending. This may result in a charge under s 98A as the warrant enabling the evidence to be 
gathered was granted on this basis, but the other substantive charge(s) also made out by the 
evidence collected comprise the primary focus of the prosecution. Section 98A therefore may 
act as a gateway for gathering evidence necessary to convict under other substantive offences, 
consequentially meaning there is no need to proceed with, or focus resources on, the s 98A 
charge, resulting in its withdrawal.  
3 Efficiency tool 
Although a s 98A charge may not result in successful conviction and is regularly withdrawn, it 
can prove useful as a tool through which multiple offenders and/or multiple offences can be 
prosecuted together.176 Charges under s 98A are readily able to justify a joinder of offenders 
or charges as the prosecution can establish that a joinder will prevent “duplication of time and 
effort for witnesses and the Court system” as well avoid any “risk of inconsistent verdicts”.177 
Thus s 98A is a mechanism through which the court’s efficiency is improved; the costs of 
holding different trials, potentially in multiple locations, for offenders facing multiple criminal 
offences can be streamlined into one trial.  An example of this is R v Robinson where s 98A 
was used to bring a group of offenders together despite the fact that “the large majority of the 
counts involve one accused only” to reduce the time and costs of prosecution.178    
                                                 
173  Robertson, above n 129, at [SS48.03].  
174  Alistair Murray, above n 125.   
175  Organised and Financial Crime Agency New Zealand, above n 2, at 5.  
176  Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 138.  
177  R v Fenton CA223/00; CA299/00, 14 September 2000 at [25].  
178  R v Robinson HC AucklandCRI-2004-004-10413, 23 June 2006 at [3].  
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V Conclusion  
Measuring the success of s 98A is always going to be a difficult task as the provision seeks to 
address a concept which has been and remains undefined – ‘organised crime’. If success is 
determined by a provision’s conviction rate, s 98A is inefficacious. Traversing some possible 
explanations for this low rate and apparent lack of success has formed a compelling argument 
in this author’s mind that s 98A is a problematic provision.  
The difficulties of s 98A stem from its mixed conceptual origins. The evolution of s 98A has 
seen its approach in criminalising ‘organised crime’ transition from organisational to 
functional; instead of targeting organised crime based on who is engaging in criminal activity, 
s 98A now criminalises based on what the criminal activities are. Nonetheless, the remnants of 
an organisational approach influence s 98A, and thus liability under s 98A extends beyond New 
Zealand’s international obligations. Section 98A is a broad provision.  
To combat this broadness s 98A protects civil liberties by placing a burden on the prosecution 
to establish the group’s prohibited objective and an offender’s knowledge of it. To discharge 
this burden, the de facto approach of the prosecution is to establish another substantive offence, 
rendering the s 98A subsidiary to, or predicated upon, this other charge(s). The need to establish 
another substantive offence makes s 98A problematic: police resources are focussed on the 
other substantive charges at the expense of those under s 98A.  This reality fosters the 
withdrawal of s 98A charges, particularly as conviction under s 98A is unlikely to materially 
increase an offender’s sentence. Being subsidiary may also make s 98A charges akin to 
inadvertent overcharging where they facilitate conviction under other substantive charges. 
Such conduct is problematic as overcharging has been regarded as “socially undesirable, 
immoral, and even corrupt.”179 The use of s 98A as an evidence gathering tool may further 
increase the prevalence of withdrawal. 
The benefits s 98A provides as an efficiency enhancing tool fail, in this author’s opinion, to 
quell the overriding perception that s 98A is a problematic provision which requires 
revaluation. Section 98A’s use appears utilitarian and in frustration of Parliament’s intent; it 
acts as a means-to-an-end rather than a substantive offence imposing group liability as 
Parliament intended.  
7,980 words (not including footnotes, table in Appendix 1 and bibliography). 
                                                 
179  Graham, above 163, at 701.  
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VI Appendix 1 
This data shows the number of people charged and convicted under s 98A and the number of charges withdrawn. The total number of charges may 
be greater than this. The data proved was based on disposed charges. Although s 98A first came into force in 1998, the first charges disposed under 
the section occurred in 1999. 
                                                 
180  Statistics New Zealand “Statistics for Adults prosecuted in court - most serious offence calendar year” (30 May 2015) NZ.Stat Table Builder <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
181  Note that information obtained under the two Official Information Act 1982 Requests, above n 3, are inconsistent.   
182  Ibid. 
183  Ibid.  
Outcome 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
TOTAL/ 
AVERAGE % 
Convicted 0 1 1 0 10 19 5 11 2 6 15 21 19 49 37 19 215 
Not Convicted 
(‘unsuccessful 
charges’) 
8 2 1 2 60 137 37 44 31 19 34 27 45 118 116 129 810 
Total Charges 8 3 2 2 70 156 42 55 33 25 49 48 64 167 153 148 1025 
Withdrawn 
Charges  8 2 1 1 50 96 36 21 33 15 36 23 31 53 80 98 584 
Conviction %  0.00 33.33 50.00 0.00 14.29 12.18 11.90 20.00 6.06 24.00 30.61 43.75 29.69 29.34 31.90 24.18 21.00% 
National 
conviction %180 
76.88 75.64 76.09 75.90 75.76 75.1 76.9 77.76 77.92 78.02 78.5 79.85 81.74 81.83 82.68 83.51 78.31% 
% of unsuccessful  
s 98A charges 
withdrawn 
100 100 100 50 83.33 70.07 97.30 47.73 
100
181 
78.95 
100
182 
85.19 68.89 44.92 68.97 75.97 72.10% 
% of total s 98A 
charges withdrawn 100 66.66 50.00 50.00 71.43 61.54 85.71 38.18 
100
183 
60.00 73.47 47.92 48.44 31.74 52.29 66.22 56.98% 
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